While the Bar of the Hyde Act is explicit for Indian tests, the NSG waiver is implicit but unwavering. The waiver of the NSG is distinctively enshrined in the NSG guidelines, paragraph 16, which deals with the consequence of a “nuclear aircraft explosion”. Section 3 (e) of the waiver deals with this key paragraph that allows a supplier to request a special meeting of the NSG in the event of a review or any other “violation of a supplier-destination understanding” and to request an end to the cooperation. The Bush administration`s recent letter to Congress cited how this rule in paragraph 16 will effectively bind India under the Hyde Act, in the pain of a halt to all U.S.-sponsored multilateral cooperation. India will not be able to escape the conditions set by the United States by reaching out to other suppliers.  In the run-up to the implementation of the agreement, both sides have attempted to articulate an incised path by working positively on the relationship and removing the possibility of conflict.  In the agreement, there was a dispute over the issue of civil liability. Following the aforementioned litigation and the continuing issue of liability in the wake of the Bhopal Gas tragedy, the Indian Parliament passed the Nuclear Damage Civil Liability Act in 2010, which created compensation mechanisms for victims, provisions relating to supplier liability (section 17B) and potentially unlimited liability under other laws (section 46).  These aspects of the law have hindered the implementation of the nuclear agreement between India and the United States. News of Saudi Arabia`s alleged undeclared nuclear cooperation with China to extract uranium yellowcake from uranium ore has generated bipartisan concern from U.S. lawmakers over the kingdom`s nuclear weapons intentions, and it may stoke existing tensions between the White House and Congress over the administration`s lack of transparency over the United States` own negotiations with Saudi Arabia for civil nuclear cooperation.
Since the beginning of 2019, members of Congress have become increasingly concerned about the regional risks of nuclear proliferation and security associated with the conclusion of a nuclear cooperation agreement with the kingdom, in part because of fears that Saudi Arabia will use reactor technologies and enrichment know-how from an agreement to one day build nuclear weapons.